Volume 2 (1), June 2019, Pages 7-28

Anna Triantafyllou1, Panagiotis Sarigiannidis1, Antonios Sarigiannidis2, Erkuden Rios3, Eider Iturbe3

1Department of Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, University of Western Macedonia, Kozani 50100, Greece, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it., This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

2Sidroco Holdings Ltd, Limassol, Cyprus 3113, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

3Fundacion Tecnalia Research and Innovation, Derio, Spain E-20009, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it., This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.


The Electric Smart Grid (ESG) is referred to as the next generation electricity power network. It is an intelligent critical infrastructure aiming to create an automated and distributed advanced energy delivery network while preserving information privacy and offering protection against intrusions. This study proposes the implementation of an Anonymous Incident Communication Channel (AICC) amongst smart grids across Europe to improve situational awareness and enhance the security of the new electric intelligent infrastructures. All participating organizations will have the ability to broadcast sensitive information, stored anonymously in a repository, without exposing the reputation of the organization. However, the technical details of the attack will be available for everyone to take appropriate countermeasures. The advantages of the AICC are the exchange of real-time security data and analysis, the circulation of best countermeasures practices, the comparison of various security solutions both from a technical and operational viewpoint and the ability to establish an open dialogue amongst anonymous peers who represent smart grid organizations (e.g., power plants) across Europe. This work focuses on the requirements of establishment, the possible obstacles, and proposed data protection techniques to be applied in the AICC. Furthermore, were explained some details of the documentation of cyber-incidents  Last but not least, were also provided the benefits and the potential risks of this AICC concept.


Smart Grid; anonymity; group signature; anonymous repository of incidents. 




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